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NOTES
NO FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE:
THE HART PROPOSAL
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, automobile insurance was purchased to indemnify
the holder of the policy against claims of victims in accidents
in which he was at fault.1 Fault or tort law determined who, by
his actions at the time of the accident, had caused the accident.2
Loss was then shifted to this individual if the claimant himself
was found to be without fault." This system has survived. What
is paid today, upon proof of fault in an automobile accident, is
a portion of the large pool of insurance premiums paid into an
insurance company by its policyholders. 4
Originally intended as indemnification of future wrongdoers,
the pool of funds created by a large number of policyholders has
become compensation for the victims.5 Wrongdoers seldom pay
out of their own pockets. It is the insurers who make the necessary
payments. The fault system selects who has done the wrong and
thus (with the almost universal existence of liability insurance),
which company pays. The individual is punished by higher premiums,
and cancellation or nonrenewal of his policy.
A no-fault system is antithetical to present tort concepts. Such
a system replaces tort liability insurance and the three party claims
procedure with a two party claims procedure under which a victim
claims directly against the insurer of his own or, if a guest, his
hosts' vehicle. The term "no-fault" stems from the exemption of
the insured from tort liability regardless of fault. A person suffering
injury arising out of ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor
vehicle is entitled to benefits without regard to fault. Generally,
1. An excellent discussion of the history of tort law in this country including its
development at the time of the origin of automobile insurance can be found in D PA T-
wENT OF TRANSPORTATION, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION STUDY, THE ORIGIN
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGLIGENCE ACTION (1970). [Hereinafter referred to as DOT
STUDY].
2. Id. at 44-49.
3. Id.
4. Hearings on H. Con. Res. 241 Before the Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance
of the House Committee an Interstate and Foreign Commerce4 92d Cong., 1st Seas., pt.
2, No Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance, 350-351 (1971) (New York State Insurance De-
partment Report to Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller).
5. Id. at 826 (Statement of Benjamin Schenk, New York Superintendent of Insurance):
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such payments are intended to be denied to those who cause injury
or damage intentionally, while committing a felony, or while driving
a vehicle as a converter without a good faith belief that there is
legal entitlement to operate the vehicle.8  Additionally, many plans
also deny the tort exemption to drivers who were intoxicated or
under the influence of drugs at the time of the accident.7
On February 24, 1971, Senator Philip H. Hart (D. Mich.), for
himself and Senator Warren G. Magnuson (D. Wash.), introduced
the Uniform Motor Vehicle Insurance Act (hereinafter referred to
as S.945) into the Senate." The bill was referred to the Committee
on Commerce, subsequently re-written, and labeled the National
No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act (hereinafter referred to as
Committee Print 1).9 This note considers the viability of no-fault
insurance generally, and the Hart proposal specifically. In a discus-
sion of any no-fault plan, it must be decided if a change in existing
insurance practices is warranted. Therefore, a broad discussion of
6. These provisions are all included in the Hart proposal See S. 945, Committee Print
One, 92d Cong., 1st Seas. § 5(3)(B) (1971).
7. The Massachusetts Plan has both these exemptions. See Massachusetts Tries No
Fault, 57 A.B.A.,J. 431, 432 (1971). In Canada, the British Columbia Plan embraces both
requirements. DOT STuDY, O0mPARATrvE STUDIEs rN AUTOMOBILE AccIDENT COMPENSATIoN
172 (1970). The Saskatchewan Plan removes the tort exemption in the case of one injured
while under the influence of alcohol only. Id. at 174.
Recovery for intangible losses such as pain and suffering has caused considerable
debate within a fault v. no-fault context, and has led to a variety of approaches. Some
plans incorporate a threshold limit below which recoveries for pain and suffering cannot
be sought. Massachusetts allows recovery for pain and suffering if the reasonable and
necessary medical, hospital and other related expenses exceed five hundred dollars,
unless the injury results In death or in certain described permanent injuries. See MASS.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 6D (Supp. 1971). Illinois, in its new No Fault Insurance
Law, allows suit for pain and suffering limited to the total of a sum equal to 50 percent
of the reasonable medical treatment expenses incurred if and to the extent that these
total $500 or less, and a sum equal to the amount of such reasonable expenses, if any,
in excess of $500. See Legalized Consuier Fraud, TsuL, Nov.-Dec., 1971, at 35. These
"threshhold" restrictions are lifted where the injury results in death, dismemberment,
permanent total or partial disability, or permanent serious disfigurement. Id. at 86.
The Illinois experience indicates that states must be careful in drafting no-fault
legislation. On December 29, 1971, the Circuit Court of Cook County struck down the
Illinois No Fault Automobile Insurance Act because several of its Provisions, including
the one cited above, created classes of people which were patently discriminated against.
Illinois is not a compulsory insurance state. Therefore, those persons who do not own
an automobile or are not covered under insurance of their own, could not recover if
injured in an accident. Neither could they collect as pedestrians injured by a non-insured
driver. The Court also felt that under the act, persons entitled to identical medical
treatment could receive widely disparate amounts of compensation depending upon the
locality in which the injury ocurred, which hospital was used, which doctor was em-
ployed, and the wealth or poverty of the victim--all of which constituted discrimination of
the "rankest kind." Grace v. Howlett, Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook County, Dec. 29, 1971, reported in
40 U.S.L.W. 2429, 2437 (Jan. 18, 1972).
Other plans have offered coverage for tangible ancl intangible losses in excess
of those limits allowed in the plan, on an optional basis. See S. 945, Committee Print
One, 92d Cong., lot Seas. § 5(c) (1971).
8. S. 945, 92d Cong., 1st Seas. (1971). Senator Hart also introduced three supple-
mentary bills regulating other aspects of the motor vehicle insurance industry. These
were: S. 946, S. 947, S. 948. See 117 CoNe. REc. 1827 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1971) (remarks
of Senator Hart). A discussion of them is beyond the scope of this article. A bill
similar to S. 945 was introduced into the House of Representatives on April 20, 1971,
by Congressman John E. Moss: H.R. 7514, 92d Cong., 1st Seas. (1971).
9. S. 945, Committee Print One, 92d Cong., let Sees. (1971). H.R. 7514 was also
re-written by the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. The now bill,
cited as H.R. 10222, is also termed the National No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act
As the House and Senate bills are almost identical, we will discuss only one-the Senate
version.
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some present problems facing the insurance industry is included
to provide a basis upon which to analyze the Hart proposal. Though
the bill is quite comprehensive, discussion herein is limited to those
provisions generally fostering most of the controversy presently
surrounding the subject. The sections felt to be most pertinent in-
clude those abolishing tort liability, providing for mandatory benefits,
optional benefits, institution of suits, and the role of counsel. Attend-
ant issues such as fraud, collateral sources, jurisdiction of suits,
and costs are also covered. The benefits of discussing the Hart
proposal are two-fold: (1) The federal bill may very well become
law before many states act on their own; and (2) the provisions
of the federal plan provide an excellent framework in which to
discuss those issues surrounding no-fault most pertinent to North
Dakotans.
PRESENT PROBLEMS
The reform of automobile accident insurance is a topic of
heated controversy throughout most of the Western World.
Dissatisfaction with the delays, ineffectiveness, and high
cost of the present system is prevalent everywhere. In many
countries, including the United States, change appears im-
minent.10
In capsule form, this represents the present state of the
automobile insurance industry. No one really knows the exact
source of the dissatisfaction, or when it began. Nevertheless, for
several years, the industry has been under investigation. As a
result, Congress, in 1968, appropriated two million dollars for use
by the Department of Transportation, to conduct a comprehensive
study and investigation of the existing compensation system for
motor vehicle accident losses." The Joint Resolution recorded four
specific congressional findings which substantially guided the con-
duct and scope of the study. The second one concluded:
• . . there is growing evidence that the existing system of
compensation for such loss and suffering is inequitable, in-
adequate, and insufficient and is unresponsive to existing
social, economic and technological conditions .... 12
The insurance industry, long entrenched in the present system,
was quickly enmeshed in the controversy. The gauntlet was prompt-
ly thrown and the battle joined:
I am personally getting tired of hearing everybody in Wash-
10. DOT STUDY, eupra note 7, at 149.
11. Pub. L. No. 90-313, 82 Stat. 126 (1968).
12. Id.
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ington and everybody who has a constituent who he thinks
might listen to this, . .. talking about the consumer and
how the insurance companies are screwing up the deal for
the customers ....
If the American public is going to continue to drive
around the streets and highways and kill 50 or 60,000 people
a year and maim millions and cause damage, and they
want to be insured further, it is going to cost them.
The only way you can get the price of insurance down
is get the accidents down . . .. Now I hope we waste less
time arguing about legal systems and spend more time roll-
ing up our sleeves and . . . getting out and insisting things
be done.'3
The argument referred to is the controversy surrounding the
subject of this note-no-fault insurance. Though hardly known
before the 1960's, the no-fault concept has evolved into a seemingly
viable alternative to the tort liability system under which auto-
mobile insurance companies had been operating since the turn
of the century. In the middle 1960's, two law professors co-authored
what has become the model format of a classic no-fault plan.
14
Published in 1965, their plan marked what was perhaps the apex
of the long struggle of no-fault for recognition in this country.
As a result, the upstart "no-fault" concept now is challenging
the older, traditional fault liability system of settling traffic accident
claims. While protagonists of the new system point to public de-
mand for equitable changes in the automobile liability insurance
system, the opposition denies any such demand exists. 5 Several
states have already adopted plans embodying the concepts of no-
fault in varying degrees and more are expected to fall in line. 6
13. Remarks of Edmund J. O'Brien, General Counsel, Lumbermans Mutual Casualty
Company-Kemper Insurance, to the Minnesota State Bar Association Convention, St. Paul,
Minn., on June 5, 1968, reproduced in MINNESOTA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, MINNESOTA
PRACTICE MANUAL 25 (1968). [Hereinafter referred to as MINNESOTA PRACTICE MANUAL
251.
14. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM-A BLUE-
PRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965). [Hereinafter cited as KEETON-
O'CONNELL].
15. Hearings on H. Con. Res. 241, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 702 (Statement of Edward
W. Kuhn, Past President, American Bar Association).
The reader should not be misled by the term "newer system". Actually a type
of limited liability plan was prepared in 1932 which included a schedule of benefits for
out-of-pocket losses without regard to negligence. See Hearings on S. Res. 40- Before
the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 18B, The Insurance Industry, 13357 (1971) (The Columbia Plan).
It is In comparison to the present long-accepted system that no-fault achieves its
nouveau character.
16. Massachusetts became the first state to adopt a no-fault plan-begun Jan. 1,
1971. Puerto Rico had already passed a "Social Protection Plan for Victims of Automobile
Accidents" In 1968. See Fournier, No-Fault System: Social Protection Inlsurance, 38 INS.
COUN. J. 139 (1971).
Five others-Florida, Illinois, South Dakota, Delaware and Oregon-have since
made similar changes. Many of the remaining states appear ready to include the subject
as a topic in their legislative dockets. Is No-Fault Insurance the Answer, U.S. Nnws
AND WORLD REPORT, Jan. 3, 1972, at 27.
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A growing number of independent plans abound. 17 Several foreign
countries have adopted or are considering plans which compensate
traffic victims without regard to fault.' 8 And most of the Canadian
provinces have adopted plans which embrace the no-fault concept. 19
The divergence in the several no-fault plans extant has been
prompted by differences of opinion in how to cope with the gen-
erally admitted anomalies in the present system. The need for
reform generally, or the viability of a plan specifically, cannot
be appreciated without a recognition of these inadequacies.
1. Court Congestion and Delay
The present automobile liability system has been criticized as
contributing to the considerable backlog burdening many courts
today.20 Studies have shown that 11.4 per cent of judge time in
federal district courts, and 17 per cent in state courts of general
jurisdiction, is involved with motor accident litigation.
2 1
Metropolitan areas in particular are plagued by a delay in
hearing automobile claims. 22 Delay is obviously less a problem
in less populated states like North Dakota because fewer people
mean fewer claims. 23 In either area, a great majority of claims
are settled out of court.24 Yet it may still be inappropriate to
shunt the problem of delay aside.
In the first place, negligible court delay merely means less
court delay. Whether a victim is waiting 6, 12, or 18 months to
be compensated, rather than two or three years, does not alter
the fact that he is still waiting. Out of court settlements live a
rather long life also. Counsel for the injured plaintiff may prefer
17. Most of these can be found in W. ROxEs, NO-FAULT INSURANCE (1971). In his
book, Dr. Rokes sets out or analyzes upwards of 40 plans.
18. An excellent discussion of present compensation practices in France, Germany,
Great Britain, Sweden and Canada can be found in DOT STUDY, supra note 7. See also
KXETON-O'CoNNELL, supra note 14.
19. See DOT STUDY, supra note 1, at 149.
20. In his introduction of S. 945, Senator Hart emphasized that criticism has come
from both Chief Justice Warren Burger and former Chief Justice Earl Warren. 117
CONG. Rzc. 1827 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1971).
21. Id.
22. A study of the Law Division (handling claims of $10,000 or more) of the Circuit
Court of Cook County (which includes Chicago, Illinois) has revealed that 62.7 percent
of the personal injury cases filed each month in 1968 involved motor vehicles; as of the
third quarter of 1969 there were 40,323 such cases pending. Hearings on S. Res. 40, supra
note 15, at 13381 (Letter from Chief Judge John S. Boyle to Hon. Philip A. Hart re-
ference the Circuit Court of Cook County). A comparison of the average of cases which
went to verdict during the third quarter of 1967, 1968, and 1969 showed that Law
Division cases averaged 61 months and Municipal District No. 1 cases (claims of
$10,000 and under) averaged 38.4 months. Id. at 13383.
However, the court congestion in metropolitan areas is probably not the prime
mover in seeking reform as has been assumed by most opponents to no-fault. DOT
STUDIEs have shown that seriously injured accident victims or their survivors wait on
the average 16 months for final settlement.
23. See Proceedings of the North Dakota State Bar Association Convention, 48 N.D.
L. REv. 159, 166 (1971) (remarks of Robert Vogel).
24. I{EETON-O'CONNELL, supra note 14, at 15.
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to wait several months to obtain a certain prognosis of permanent
injury to his client before proceeding to trial. Secondly, it is also
well understood in the profession that maximum efforts by the
defense to settle are often induced only by the imminence of a
trial. Delay can be an important tool to an insurance company
as well. Claims adjustors are reminded that delay may occasionally
influence a claimant to lower his demand.
2 5
Court congestion has other causes besides an over abundance
of personal injury cases such as incompetent judges, sloppy man-
agement, long summer recesses and a short court day.26 And
there are methods other than no-fault insurance which hold great
promise in the relief of court congestion. One which has proven
successful is compulsory arbitration.2 7 Unfortunately, despite these
facts, delay can still be a problem to injured traffic victims in
rural states as well as in more densely populated areas.
The speed with which accident claims are disposed of is not
always a measure of the speed of actual compensation received.
One Department of Transportation study revealed that, in the study
sample used, 33 per cent of all claims had been settled in 60
days. However, only seven per cent of the loss dollars involved
had been paid. Though 76 per cent of all claims had been settled
within one year, only 45 per cent of all benefits finally received,
had been paid out within that time .
2
Although partial interim payments to tort claimants in advance
of final settlement by insurance companies promises to improve
the timeliness of compensation, studies show that so far, such
payments remain small in comparison to total payments.2 9 Further,
they have evidently not had any substantial effect in improving
the elapsed time to final settlement.30
Lawyer time is, of course, concommittantly taken up with auto
accident cases. Better results follow experience and most of the
work falls into the hands of a small group of personal injury
25. Hearings on S. Res. 233 Before the Subcommittee an Anti-trust and Monopoly of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 14, at 8491 (1968)
(Section II (A) (2) (b) under "Negotiations" heading in the Allstate Ins. Company's
Adjustor's Workbook).
26. Hearings on H. Co. Res. 241, supra note 4, at 754 (Report of the American Bar
Association Special Committee on Automobile Accident Reparations, approved in August,
1969).
27. See Hearings on S. Res. 40, supra note 15, pt. 18A, 13251-13259 (Statistical Report
on Compulsory Arbitration-County Court of Philadelphia-Compulsory Arbitration Div-
ision).
28. After two years and nine months, only 82 percent of the total payments had
been received. DOT STUDY, MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES AND THEIR COMPENsATION IN
THE UNITED STATES, Table 14, at 42 (1971).
29. About 8 percent of fatality and serious injury cases in the DOT STUDY sample
reoelved some kind of interim payments. For all personal injury tort claims studied, 5.2
percent of all paid claimants received some advance payment, such payments representing
6.4 percent of total losses. DOT STUDY, supra note 28, at 43.
30. Id.
specialists.$' This overaccumulation of cases can cause gaps in
court calendars through continuances granted to overworked at-
torneys.
82
2. The Contingent Fee
Data shows that legal fees totaling 1.1 billion dollars will be
paid on auto accident claims for 1969. This is estimated to be one-
quarter of the total income of the legal profession for that year.33
These facts have been used to condemn the legal profession because
it is paid moneys which are needed by traffic accident victims.
The income lawyers receive from personal injury cases in this
country cannot be disputed. But to attack the profession is to
attack a result and not the source of present inequities. It would
be innocuous to reform the present system merely to rid it of the
contingent fee. Legal fees include those generated by defense coun-
sel on retainers to the insurance companies. Congressional hearings
have quite properly focused on the insurance industry-not the
legal profession. The recalcitrance of insurance companies to settle
larger claims is, as much as any other reason, to blame for the
incomes received by the legal profession.
3. Insufficient Compensation
Quite apart from the fact that payments may be late-they
are often insufficient.3 4 Much of the problem stems from the fact
that those with minor losses are overcompensated while those with
relatively severe injuries are undercompensated. 5 In support of
this, a comparison of reparations received by fatally or severely
injured persons revealed that when the economic loss was less
than $500, victims recovering under tort received an average of
four and one-half times their actual loss. Similarly successful tort
claimants averaged a net recovery of only one-third of their eco-
31. In Cook County it was determined that as of Mar. 31, 1967, 47 attorneys or
firms reprensented 21,557 plaintiffs and 49 attorneys and firms represented 42,656 de-
fendants. Hearings on S. Res. 40, supra note 15, at 13398.
32. Id. Many times a firm will send an associate to a conference without authority
to settle a case.
33. 117 CONo. REC. 1827 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1971).
34. The problem Is a long continuing one. A study made by the Columbia University
Council for Research in the Social Sciences, covering 1929 and 1930, revealed that though
87 percent of the motor vehicle accident claimants studied received some payment, re-
latively slight Injuries were being overpaid and the more seriously hurt were underpaid,
and that was only after a long delay. KEETON-O'CONNELL, supra note 14, at 35, 36-37,
40 n.99. The Columbia study related to closed cases in which a claim was made and was
limited to claimants who retained a lawyer.
A similar study conducted In 1951 concluded that "the same facts and the same
problems are still with us today". Law, Compensation for Auto Accident V'ictims: A
Story of Too Little and Too Late, 26 CONN. B.J. 70 (1952), discussed In KEETON-O'CoN-
NELL, supra note 14, at 40.
35. DOT STUDY, supra note 28, at 36.
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nomic losses when these were over $25,000.86 Further studies have
shown that 27 per cent of the half-million seriously injured auto
accident victims in 1968 suffered 85 per cent of the group's total
loss. Of that group, claimants with a permanent total disability
(and an average total economic loss of $78,000) recovered only
16 per cent of their loss in insurance benefits.
87
These anomalies are tempered somewhat by the fact that the
tort system is simply not designed to compensate everyone for
their losses. Most claims are settled out of court. Doubtful minor
claims usually receive quick payment because of the administrative
expenses encountered in an investigation and defense. Thus, in-
surance companies can more easily bring their big guns to bear
on the larger claims.88
Low recovery rates by the seriously injured are also partly
explained by the high incidence of low bodily injury liability insur-
ance. About 30 per cent of all policies studied in the sample of
claimants studied by the Department of Transportation had coverage
of only $10,000/$20,000. 9 Uninsured motorists also constitute a low
recovery potential for claimants because uninsured motorists cov-
erage and unsatisfied judgment funds are limited.
40
4. Collateral Source Payments
When payments from tort sources have proved insufficient, other
sources have inevitably grown in importance. 41 Figures show that
the percentage of total compensation received from collateral, non-
tort sources such as medical insurance and wage replacement (e.g.,
sick leave, workman's compensation, social security) generally in-
creases as losses increase.
4 2
Though the public has come to rely more and more on collateral
source benefits when involved in automobile accidents, their pres-
36. DOT STUDY, aupra note 28, at 36.
87. 117 CONG. Rnc. 1827 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1971). Thousands of these families were
forced to economically change their way of life downward.
38. DOT STUDY, supra note 28, at 37.
39. DOT STUDY, supra note 28, at 37. Recovery under the tort system "is virtually de-
pendent on the availability of Insurance". Low coverage limits equals low recovery
'potential for the victim.
40. DOT STUDY, supra note 28, at 37. The North Dakota Unsatisfied Judgement Fund
is limited to $10,000/$20,000 coverage which is lessened by any amounts received from
either an uninsured motorists policy or from workmen's compensation. See N.D. CENT.
CODE § 39-17-07 (1960).
41. About nine out of ten fatally or seriously injured victims receive some type of
compensation. DOT STUDY, supra note 28, at 38. Family medical insurance appears to
be the most common, followed closely by auto liability insurance.
42. One DOT STUDY showed that the compensation percentage from tort sources ran
from a high of 74 percent for losses under $500 to a low of 17 percent for losses over
$25,000. DOT STUDY, supra note 28, table 11, at 39, 40.
In the DOT STUDY sample, victims with compensable economic losses under
$2:500 accounted for only 7 percent of the total losses but received 27 percent of the
net tort payments. In contrast, victims with economic loss in excess of $10,000 suffered
77 percent of total losses but recvived only 36 percent of the net tort payments.
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ence has yet to overcome deficiencies in automobile liability pay-
ments. Payments from such sources reach little more than one-
half of total reparations going to auto accident victims.43 But even
these give only minimal relief. Of the aggregate benefits received
by dependents of deceased victims and by seriously injured victims
of traffic accidents in 1967, it was found that less than half of
the total compensable economic losses were returned." Though
the Department of Transportation admitted the "relative impre-
cision" of these estimates, it felt confident enough to state that
"at least in overall terms, it can be seen that total benefits from
all compensation systems fell far short of compensating the eco-
nomic losses of those most severely affected by motor vehicle
accidents.' '45
5. Rising Insurance Costs
Inequitable payment practices, imprecise when isolated, take
their full measure when weighed with insurance rates and costs,
and the manner in which they are applied to the public. From
1960 to 1970, the automobile insurance consumer index rose 70.3
per cent. The rate of increase for all other items for that period
averaged only 34.3 per cent while the rate of medical care rose
57 per cent.
46
To a large extent, these increases are controlled by those
elements which comprise the cost of insurance benefits (and pre-
miums). Costs of repairing damaged automobiles have risen dras-
tically. This is also true of doctor's fees and hospital costs.
47 It
cannot be disputed that much of the reason for rate increases
originates with these services. Furthermore, though it has been
43. A study at the University of Pennsylvania revealed that almost one-half of the
victims studied received no collateral source reparations at all. Payments that were re-
ceived were inadequate. Of 71 traffic victims whose losses were over $1500, fourteen
received nontort benefits equaling half or more of their losses. Paul, The Financial
Impact of Automobile Accidents, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 913 (1962), discussed in KEETN-
O'CONNELL, supra note 28, at 40, 41-42.
A Michigan study of that state revealed that the growth of nontort sources such
as health insurance and survivor's and disability benefits under social security have
reached the point where such sources supply approximately one-half of total reparations.
Of 86,120 victims included in the study sample, only 77 percent received money from
any source. Sixty three percent received nothing "via the tort route." KEETON-O'CONNELL,
supra note 28, at 42-43, discussing CONARD, MORGAN, PRATT, VoLTY & BOMBAUGH,
AUToMoBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS-STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY
REPARATION 147, 174 (1964).
44. DOT STUDY, supra note 28. Compensable economic losses for dependents of de-
ceased victims or those seriously injured amounted to $5,127 million, while aggregate
benefits (net reparations received plus future benefits expected) equalled $2,533 million.
45. DOT STUDY, supra note 28.
46. 117 CONG. REC. 1827, table 8, at 1835 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1971). While the rate
of increase of personal consumption expenditures from 1960 to 1970 increased 89.6
percent, the comparable rise for automobile insurance premiums was 123.8 percent. Id.
at Table 10.
47. Doctor's fees have risen 100 percent in 20 years, and hospital care some 354 percent
over the same span. See Hearings on S. Res. 233, supra note 25, at 8472 (Statement of
George H. Kline, Vice President, Secretary and General Counsel, Allstate Insurance Co.).
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estimated that 56 cents of each dollar paid into the system goes
for company overhead and court and lawyer's fees, and only 14
cents ultimately pays out of pocket losses to victims, it should be
remembered that these figures relate only to the bodily injury
portion of insurance premiums. 48 Since only a fraction of the pre-
mium dollar pays for bodily injury coverage, price advantages
gained by a switch to a no-fault system will likely occur only
within the bodily injury premiums.49
6. Rating Practices
Apart from the fact that all insureds are generally paying
more than ever for automobile insurance-some pay more or en-
counter more trouble in acquiring insurance than do others with
similar driving records.
Thousands of older drivers are having their insurance cancelled
or denied renewal or are having their rates increased because
they have reached what appears to be arbitrarily imposed age
limits. Many who shop around for lower rates find themselves
unable to find any type of insurance other than "assigned risk"
coverage.50 These practices are inconsistent with studies which
indicate that older drivers are often better risks than younger
drivers. 51 One report from a national study concluded that the
older driver has less than his proportionate share of "all accidents,"
"fatal accidents," and "injury accidents"; and that the older driver
has the lowest median accident involvement index of any age
group.
52
48. 117 CONG. REc. 1827, Table 2, at 1834 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1971).
49. That is, of course, assuming that this is the only place to lower rates. It Is
contended that auto insurance company claims of under-writing losses are not borne
out by the facts. Thirteen companies, which wrote 43 percent of all auto policies for
1968, achieved an after-tax rate of profit ranging from 6.2 to 23.6 percent. There Is
some reason then, to believe that rates can be voluntarily lowered. Hearings on S.
Res. 40, supra note 15, pt. 17, at 10248-10249.
It has been proposed that the spiraling costs of automobile insurance may be
Inhibited by the inclusion of investment income earned by the various assets held by the
Insurance companies, as part of the underwriting profit allowed In ratemaking. The
basic issue is the ownership of the assets represented by unearned premium and loss
reserves. The findings of one report Indicate that the inclusion of investment income as a
part of the underwriting profit will have little affect on the major dissatisfactions with
present pricing and Profit practices. Id. at 10424-10427. One conclusion made is that there
really is no Internal means by which the Insurance industry can lower its rates. The loss
rates in the automobile industry are rising. The consensus seems to be that an external
remedy is needed. Id. at 10441 (remarks of Dr. David M. Boodman, Head, Operations
Research Group, Management Sciences Division, Arthur D. Little, Inc.).
The evidence shows that things ought to change. If they do not change
through the acknowledgement of social responsibility, change will be dictated by the
market place. Change is Inevitable. It has been stated that change should be Intentional
rather than left to the forces of the market place. Id. at 10446-10447 (See remarks of
Dr. Irving H. Plotkin, Arthur D. Little, Inc.)
50. Hearings on S. Ies 233, supra note 25, at 8465-8466 (Statement by Senator
Harrison A. Williams, Jr.).
51. Hearings on S. Res. 233, supra note 25, at 8457.
62. Hearings on S. Res. 40, aupra note 15, pt. 17, at 10231 (conclusions to an article
by Judge Sherman G. Finesilver).
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The declining availability of automobile insurance extends to
black ghetto residents. Higher premiums are often charged black
residents and many times the only companies willing to write
policies are those with questionable financial structures. 3 These
problems are shared by the poor and other minority groups. Many
cases have shown the basic unavailability of automobile insurance
to the poor at low cost on a regular basis. 54 Poor and minority
groups often face arbitrary cancellations or placement into high
risk categories. 5
It is not the purpose here to imply that all the problems
facing the different groups of individuals who drive can be remedied
by some system of no-fault insurance. Nor are these inequities
in the system evidence of an intentional conspiracy in the insurance
industry to discriminate against certain classes of our citizens.
The purpose instead is to point out the existence of some anomalies
which are an inherent part of the present system. Insurance com-
panies are encouraged by the system to charge premiums on
the basis of risk classifications. The system encourages many to
lean towards what are termed "preferred risks." In the process,
uneven practices occur.
The uncertainties felt by minority groups have spread to the
public as a whole. As it is generally easier for a member of
the middle or higher income groups to obtain insurance, attention
in those quarters has shifted to premium costs and rating prac-
tices. It is entirely possible for insured drivers to back into someone,
sustain minor car damage, and suffer a substantial premium in-
crease. 56 The same fate can befall insureds who are involved in
collisions through no fault of their own. 57 A father who wishes
to insure his 17 year old son can easily experience a premium
increase of almost 67 per cent. 58 A student with a B average will
find his insurance may be almost $100 less than his friend who
has a C+ average.5 9 Company cars are insured at minimal rates-
possibly placing a greater burden on the individual insured. 0 One
insurance agent explained the problem in this manner:
53. Hearings on S. Res. 233, supra note 25, at 8555 (Statement by David B. Wash-
ington Esq., Executive Director, Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations).
54. Hearings on S. Res. 233, supra note 25, at 8315, 8316-8317 (Statement by Robert
Y. Bell, Santa Rosa Office of California Rural Legal Assistance).
55. Hearings on S. les. 233, supra note 25, at 8315, 8316-8317. It is evidently not
uncommon for these rather "unsophisticated" insurance purchasers to be sold collision
and comprehensive coverage which Protects an automobile dealer or lender bank, but
gives no liability protection to the purchasers or their victims.
56. See e.g., Hearings on S. Res. 233, supra note 25, at 8282-8283 (Letter from Ford
Bell, Insurance Agent, to Senator Philip Hart, July 5, 1968).
57. See Hearings on S. Res. 233, supra note 25, at 8800-8801 (Letter from constituent
to Senator Abraham A. Ribicoff).
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When I started selling insurance, everyone paid the same
rate. Insurance companies knew that most of the people
paid too much and some of the people paid too little, but
that was the whole idea of insurance.
Allstate and State Farm came into the insurance busi-
ness. They advertised savings of 30 per cent for those who
could qualify. They got all the safe drivers and continued
to drop their rates. Every time they reduced rates we had
to increase ours because we were ending up with all the
bad drivers.
Finally everybody went to selective underwriting . . .
and the companies have been getting more selective ever
since. We seem to want each insured to pay exactly what
the insurance is worth to him. Carried to the final extreme,
this would require everyone to be self-insured, and that is
not the purpose of the insurance business.61
Insurance companies use several methods of rating vehicle own-
ers to determine whether or not they should be covered and, if
so, how much they should pay. These are termed "objective indi-
cations," which attempt to set an individual's rates as close as
possible to his experience and potential for loss. 2 Hundreds of
classifications result. Drivers pay more or less depending upon
whether they are a lawyer, doctor, bartender, jockey, or service-
man. Any classification can be lost arbitrarily, and insurers need
give little reason for cancellations.
6 3
Because of the manner in which the present system operates,
there is wide-spread use of retail credit agency reports. Cases
of indiscriminate and incorrect information found in credit reports
are well documented. Because they use these reports, insurance
companies too have made arbitrary decisions on the basis of hear-
say and other inadequate information . 4 Many people, insurance
agents included, frown on the whole system of classifications, merit
ratings and use of credit reports .
5
Insurers stress that their standards are objective and that the
function of automobile liability insurance is to compensate victims
61. Id.
62. Hearings on S. Res. 233, supra note 25, at 8473. There are three commonly used
indicators. The first is the "classification plan" which lumps together members of a
similar occupational or age group. Depending on the group, rates may be higher or
lower. A second indicator is the use of "rating territories to establish geographical dif-
ferences". Thus, if the accident rate and claim costs in one locality are greater than
in another, higher rates will be charged in the first. The third factor often used is
"merit rating". This system classifies an individual according to his driving record. Some
companies rely on traffic violations; others simply rely on accidents in which the driver
was involved or found to be at fault. Lower rates are charged to those considered to
have a low loss potential.
63. See generally Hearings on S. Res. 233, a-upra note 25, at 8287-8292 (testimony of
Michael Van Horn, insurance agent).
64. Public pressure finally forced Congress to pass the Fair Credit Reporting Act
which was specifically designed to curtail such practices. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970).
65. See generally Hearings on S. les. 233, aupra note 25, at 8471.
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for their losses.68 Still, the adjustment of claims appears to be
premised on considerations a bit more subjective. Claims adjustors
are taught the importance of providing a full physical description
of claimants and witnesses. 67 The admitted purpose of doing this
is to allow the company an appraisal of the impression the person
will make on a jury.68 The Allstate Adjustor's Workbook describes
the purpose this way:
Our description of the person will be of added interest to
the underwriting department in many cases and often times
an adequate description of a claimant will let the sales
department know if this individual is a good prospect for
Allstate's "Full Circle" of protection. Such things as an in-
dividual's disposition, character or education may affect
greatly the method of negotiating the claim to a successful
conclusion, and give the claim examiner an insight into
some of the problems the adjustor may encounter with the
individual.6 9
Insurance adjustors also are taught to negate the need for
the claimant to contact an attorney.70 Common sense dictates that
the insurance company stands to lose more if an attorney is re-
tained by a claimant. Insurers argue, however, that keeping lawyers
out of the picture speeds up the payment process. Department
of Transportation studies indicate that the time required to settle
the tort claims of those who do not retain counsel is much shorter.71
Furthermore, claimants who retain counsel, but do not go to suit,
recover their losses more rapidly than those who sue.7 2 Unforu-
nately, those who choose not to retain counsel often recover less
than those who do, particularly in the more serious cases. 73
Because attorneys are retained on a contingent fee basis, every
claimant, rich or poor, theoretically starts out on an equal basis.
However, not everyone retains counsel. Figures indicate that the
percentage of victims in serious injury cases, who retain counsel,
66. Hearings on S. Res. 233, supra note 25, at 8471.
67. See generalty Hearings on S. Res. 233, supra note 25, at 8486 (Witness Portrait-
Allstate Adjustor's Workbook).
68. Hearings on S. Res. 233, supra note 25, at 8486. If a man is ugly or stupid, he
will obviously make a worse impression than will a man who is handsome, bright and
sincere. Some of the adjectives from the Witness Protrait in the Allstate Wookbook are:
"slovenly, verbose, dull, morose, unlettered, squinty-eyed, a bulging forehead, pock-
marked, a wide nose, puffy lips, yellow, decayed teeth, prominent Adam's apple, speaks
in a rapid voice with a pitch that resembles that of the opposite sex." (Comment by
Senator Hart).
69. Hearings on S. Res. 233, supra note 25, at 8486-8487.
70. See Hearings on S. Res. 233, supra note 25, at 8492-8493 (Adjustor's Workbook-
I. Definition and Purpose, II. Retaining Control).
71. DOT STUDY, supra note 28, at 31, 45.
72. DOT STUDY, &upra note 28, at 31, 45.
73. Figures show that average reparations received by claimants, in fatal or serious
injury cases, with and without tort recovery, were much higher for those who retained
counsel than those who did not. See DOT STUDY, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENTS INJURIES, Vol. 1, Table 40FS, at 320-321 (1970).
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increases in direct proportion to their level of education. 74 It was
also found that low income families with income under $5000 re-
ceived only 38 per cent of their personal and family economic
losses while families with incomes over $10,000 recovered 61 per
cent.
75
Insurance companies cannot be blamed for all the ills confront-
ing the socially under-privileged. Furthermore, whatever their re-
sponsibilities are in the compensation of traffic victims, insurers
are admittedly in the business for profit. Their fiduciary duties
are two-fold in that they extend to their policyholders and to their
stockholders. They must perform in accordance with each, and,
as has been shown, it is difficult to serve two masters. If the
present system encourages practices as described above, it is the
system, as well as the insurance industry which needs to be changed.
THE NATIONAL NO-FAULT MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE ACT
The National No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act is an attempt
to correct present inconsistencies by the combined use of federal
regulation and private companies. The bill itself arouses contro-
versy in many quarters, and it has been promised a rough ride
through Congress. Many opposition arguments are noteworthy and
deserve attention. As stated above, these will be equated with
relevant provisions of the bill.
I. General Effect: Tort Liability Extinguished
Committee Print 1 eliminates tort liability arising out of auto-
mobile accidents; and insurance benefits for losses arising from
them would be paid regardless of fault.76 Those injured would
be recompensated from their own insurers (first party coverage)
or the insurance company of the owner of the vehicle in which
they were riding, 77 with injured pedestrians seeking compensation
from a company covering any vehicle which caused the injury.78
Several issues arise upon the elimination of tort liability. The fol-
lowing are among the most often contested.
A. Is the Fault System Reliable?
Abolition of tort liability is, of course, the key element to
74. DOT STUDY, supra note 73, Table 46S, at 338. The table shows that victims with
little or no schooling received only 16 percent of their economic losses, while those with
a college education received 56 percent.
75. DOT STUDY, supra note 73, Table 45FS, at 337.
76. S. 945, Committee Print One, supra note 6, § 3.
77. S. 945, Staff Analysis of Committee Print One, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1971).
(Hereinafter referred to as Staff Analysis).
78. S. 945, Committee Print One, supra note 6, § 3.
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any no-fault plan. The authors of the Hart proposal feel that the
fault system is at once unreliable and unrealistic, and that an
automobile accident is not necessarily the result of a controllable
action by a driver of a vehicle. It is rather, they would contend,
the inevitable result of the speed of automobiles, human frailties,
and the rapid pace at which people live.7 9 With the great number
of vehicles on our highways and the resultant losses from collisions,
it is felt by many that the auto accident has become a social
problem similar to old-age or unemployment.8 0 If the auto accident
is looked at as inevitable and as a product of our environment,
it may be compared to a disease which requires a payment system
similar to accident and health insurance. 8'
The fault concept has been attacked as unreliable because it
involves reconstruction of accidents which cannot be accurately
remembered. It has been suggested that drivers rarely focus on
those aspects of an accident which are important in a negligence
case.8 2 It is pointed out that witnesses may later be unable to
remember, or merely confused-particularly after intensive cross
examination.
83
Opponents to no-fault feel that accidents can be accurately
reconstructed. They argue that all forms of adjudication, from
murder cases to tax questions, are fraught with the possibilities
of inadequate evidence and exploitive counsel. In traffic cases,
they assert, witnesses speak from observations which are likely
to be within the realm of everyday experience 4
Although trial techniques are needed in many ways to aid
the jury in sorting out what may be a very complex trial, experi-
enced insurance attorneys state that distortion of the facts, both
honest and dishonest, is one of the biggest problems facing claims
adjustors and trial counsel.8 5 Trial tactics, then, become a cause
for concern in the face of assertions that imperfections in the
human make-up cause variations in the perceptions and recollections
of witnesses.8 6
79. Hold, Critique of Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim-The Keeton-O'Connell
Proposal, 1968 INs. L.J. 73, 75.
80. Id.
81. Id. Interim measures have not provided the panacea looked for by the public.
Financial responsibility laws, unsatisfied Judgment funds, uninsured motorists' coverage
and other plans have all been offered as possible measures which would reform yet
not seriously endanger existing interests or the status quo. However, many feel the
problem has become insurmountable and even the insurance industry recognizes the
crisis. Fournier, No Fault System: Social Protection Insurance: A New Approach to
an old Problem, 38 INS. COUN. J. 139 (1971).
82. KEETON-O'CONNELL, supra note 14, at 16-19.
83. See Hearings on H. Con. Res. 421, supra note 4, at 793 (Report No. 18 (Powers
Report) of the A.B.A. Special Committee on Automobile Accident Reparations).
84. BLUM & KALVEN, PUBLIC LAW PERSPEcTIvES ON A PRIVATE LAW MATTER-AUTO
COMPENSATION PLANS (1965).
85. Rokes, Psychological Factors Governing the Credibility of Witnesses, 1968 INS.
L.J. 84.
86. Id.
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Assertions by trial attorneys that their defense of the tort system
transcends financial considerations and is directed at preserving
the rights of victims who have been wronged have been questioned.
Nonetheless, their attitude, attained after years of experience in
attempting to win back damages from skeptical claims adjustors,
protective defense lawyers, and finally, the vagaries of time and
delay, retains high credibility. 7 In their defense of the jury trial,
lawyers remain adamant. It must be admitted that in the face
of empirical research supporting the conclusiveness and fairness
of jury trials,8 8 there is little to rebuke their claims. Yet other
studies have shown that in many cases, where tort reparations
received by those whose case went to a verdict were compared
with those of victims who settled, amounts received were consider-
ably higher in the latter group. 9 Facts such as these, coupled
with distrust of lawyers in general, will probably always contribute
to a suspicion of monetary judgments.
B. Has the Fault System a Deterrent Value?
The Hart proposal implicitly rejects the tacit assumption that
the tort liability system acts as a deterrent to negligent driving.
Does tort law shift the loss to the guilty party? Because of the
almost universal existence of automobile insurance, the loss from
an accident has been largely shifted to the insurance mechanism
rather than the wrongdoer.9 0 It seems highly probably therefore,
that the existence of insurance effectively shields an insured tort
87. Their defense of the tort system may be less a defense of the vagaries and
uncertain outcome of the trial Itself than an attempt to retain the rights present traffic
victims have to sue recalcitrant insurance companies. There is no love lost between
insurers and plaintiff lawyers. Experienced members of the latter fraternity sue first
and ask questions later. They do this to remove the case from the hands of the claims
adjustor because they feel a fair settlement can be better attained through a combination
of negotiations with a defense lawyer and the Imminence of trial.
88. One study on a limited number of accidents revealed that, for those at least, the
fault determination was not excessively difficult and that the physical evidence in-
volved usually enabled a jury to sort out the complicated events involved. Hearings on
H. Con. Res. 241, supra note 4, at 794 n.91, 797. Other studies indicate that the sitting
Judge agrees with the jury verdict most of the time.
89. See DOT STUDY, supra note 73, Table 38FS, at 311. Obviously, many victims who
sue will lose because they may have been contributorily negligent. This raises the
alternative issue of whether those who contribute to the accident should recover any-
thing. After all, it was their fault. Yet, many of the very same people who disparage
no-fault proposals seek to eliminate the contributory negligence doctrine because it
is a "harsh rule". See Proceedings of the North Dakota State Bar Convention, suproa
note 23, at 168. This circular reasoning does little to clear the already muddied waters.
90. Marryott, A Response to the Critics of the Automobile Insurance-Tort System:
New Concepts to Protect Traffic Victims, 1967 INs. L.J. 350, 351.
One of the most interesting sidelights of the tort system is the way it sometimes
works in practice. Plaintiff attorneys are loath to sue when insurance is lacking or
nonexistent. This does not necessarily follow in cases where the state provides an Un-
satisfied Judgment Fund, but it retains credence where other forms of liability insurance
are called for.
The recent adoption of Rule 26(b)(2) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure illustrates the pre-eminence of insurance in personal injury cases. Rule 25(b)(2)
allows a party to obtain discovery of the existence and contents of any insurance
agreement under which an insurer may become liable. N.D. P. Cry. P. 26(b)(2). It
appears that insurance has become an integral part of tort law.
NOTES 459
feasor from the consequences of his act.9 1 With personal detriment
to the defendent no longer present it seems reasonable to assume
that deterrence becomes minimal. 92 Many feel the real deterrent
value originates instead with a driver's fear of the accident itself,
and the attendant pain and injury."e
Opponents feel that these conclusions must fail because they
simply are untrue. They argue that traffic accidents are not chance
occurrences. They are the result of driver fault, and negligence
on our highways will decrease as the tort system is impressed
upon accident-prone drivers. 94 It is further argued that randomly
generated accidents are not randomly distributed among the popu-
lation.9 5 One example given is that males between 15 and 25 have
the highest death rate from auto accidents. e6 This statistic is cited
as proving that traffic accidents are not chance occurrences."
Yet deeper studies into the ranks of these young drivers can be
interpreted to show how difficult deterrence really is under the
present system. Accident repeaters tend to be less adjusted socially
than those similarly aged with good driving records. 9 It has
been shown that dangerous youthful drivers are having far more
contact with courts, credit agencies, public health and social wel-
fare departments than their less accident-prone contemporaries.
If this is true, it is questionable if such drivers are deterred
by the looming prospect of a court fight which, in the main, would
be handled by their (or their father's) insurance company.
The same argument may be made about problem drinkers
involved in auto accidents. The excessive use of alcohol leads to
some 25,000 traffic deaths and 800,000 crashes each year 99-- obviously
proof that accidents involving drinkers are not chance occurrences.
Yet, for this class as well, the deterrent effect of the fault system
appears minimal. Increasing the scope of our drunk driving statutes,
and imposing more severe restrictions thereunder, is probably the
better course. 100
91. Marryott, supra note 90, at 351.
92. Marryott, supra note 90, at 351.
93. Lawton, Psychological Aspects of the Fault System as Compared with the No-
Fault System of Automobile Insurance, 20 U. KAN. L. Rzv. 57 (1971).
94. Id. at 57-58. Several studies have been cited as supporting this view. One study
showed that though only one-third of the average traffic flow on our highways occurs
at night, fully 60 percent of all fatal accidents occur at that time. Driver negligence in
the form of fatigue and alcohol are cited as the probable causes of this phenomenon.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 59.
97. Id. at 57-59. It also supports the classification of members of this group into
higher premium brackets by insurance companies.
98. Id. at 60,. When compared with accident-free drivers in a controlled study of
youthful accident repeaters, it was found that 66 percent of the latter were involved
with agencies dealing with socially maladjusted people, whereas the former groups had
a 9 and 10 percent exposure rate with such agencies.
99. Id. at 61.
100. Id. at 62. Many drunken drivers are reputable members of the community. For
them, the scandal of a criminal conviction would probably be an improved deterrent
over the threat of civil suit.
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Supporters of the fault system feel that the events following
an accident focus the "community's abhorrence" upon the wrong-
doer and help prevent future accidents. They point to the encounter
with the other driver and the police, the motor vehicle report, the
statement to the insurer, the consequent raise in premiums for a
negligent driver, and the final humiliation before a jury in a court-
room. 10 1 All of these certainly constitute the rather irritable steps
one must go through when involved in an accident. Yet, it remains
questionable if drivers are ever really deterred by the prospects
of facing such encounters. After all, the humiliation of the court-
room seldom occurs because (1) most claims are settled out of court,
and (2) those proceeding to trial will probably enter a counter-claim
of contributory negligence.
Unfortunately, arguments that the fear of an accident is a real
deterrent to careless driving are also weak. Accident analysis engi-
neers state that only the smallest of margins separates the minor
incident from the fatal one. If behavior patterns continue after
minor incidents, they argue, a major accident will result.1 0 2 Evi-
dently, many subconsciously ignore the real dangers of driving
automobiles. 10 3 Few would deliberately cause an accident, yet after
many near misses, drivers act no differently than factory workers
do around dangerous equipment or the millions who smoke cigarettes
knowing the possible consequences.'
0 4
C. Will Rating Standards Change?
It has been claimed that new rating methods would have to
be devised in a change-over to no-fault. 0 5 This evidently would
occur because the concepts upon which rate-making procedures
are presently predicated would be reversed. It is arguable that
with a no-fault system, the desirable policyholder would be the
insured who is least likely to receive substantial payments of the
mandatory benefits provided. 10 6 An example of this is an unem-
ployed teenager. Under a no-fault plan, he would become one of
the better risks. 0 7 He is unemployed (no wage loss), and he is
101. Id. at 75-76.
102. Id. at 67-68.
103. Id. at 69. This rationalization is termed "cognitive dissonance". Dissonance occurs
when an individual simultaneously holds two ideas (cognitions) which are incompatible.
The closest parallel is cigarette smoking. If a cigarette smoker knows that he may be
harming himself yet continues smoking, he experiences dissonance and subconsciously
rationalizes the absurdity of what he is doing.
104. Id. at 70.
105. Hearings on H. Con. Res. 241, supra note 4, at 861 (A.B.A. Special Committee
Report).
106. Hearings on H. Con. Res. 241, supra note 4, at 861.
107. Prooeedings of the North Dakota State Bar Association Convention, supra note
23, at 167.
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young (medical payments will be lower).108 Following this premise,
one of the poorest risks then would be an employed family man.
Not only is he employed (insurer would be subject to repaying
lost wages), but he is older (larger medical bills), and he has a
wife and family (many more possible claimants after an accident).
Essentially then, the good driver could end up subsidizing the bad.10 9
Contrary to popular opinion, however, even present insurance
systems are not tied to a pure good guy versus bad guy ideal.
Rather than abiding by the principle that each will be judged
according to his abilities, present systems are based on a multitude
of "classifications." 110 Stated more succinctly:
[T]he present system is not based primarily on good or
bad drivers; it is based on good or bad classifications ...
In addition, the good driver is already partially subsidizing
the bad. In developing rates, the rating bureaus throw all
experience together-be it good or bad-so the resultant rate
of the good driver reflects also the bad experience of the
bad. (sic)1 ' (Emphasis added).
Insurance companies use more than merit rating in settling
individual premium costs." 2 Further, these costs are strictly regu-
lated in only a handful of states.1" 3 Thus it is possible that drivers
in states where regulation is not so stiff are subsidizing drivers
in those states where it is.14
Practically speaking then, the tort liability system may have
faults which are as incipient as those which a no-fault system
allegedly would introduce. There is no question that a no-fault
law, state or federal, will dilute the importance of merit rating
108. Proceedings of the North Dakota State Bar Association Convention, supra note
23, at 167.
109. Proceedings of the North Dakota State Bar Association Convention, supra note
23, at 166. See also IEENTON-O'CONNELL, supra note 14, at 526.
110. Hearings on S. Res. 233, supra note 25, at 8535 (Remarks of Senator Philip A.
Hart to National Association of Mutual -Insurance Agents Convention, Sheraton-Chicago
Hotel, Chicago, Oct. 15, 1968). Senator Hart's comments, which came at the con-
clusion of the first set of hearings of his subcommittee on the auto Insurance Industry,
boded ill for the members of that industry. Even at that early date in the investigations
he had strong words for insurance rating practices, rate fixing bureaus (which he
termed "price-fixing cartels"), and the need to make auto Insurance available to all
motorists on reasonable and more equal terms.
111. Hearings on S. les. 233, supra note 25, at 8535.
112. Hearings on S. Res. 233, supra note 25, at 8514. It is Interesting to note that a
company as large as the Allstate Insurance Company does not always make Its rates
based on the driving experience of its own policyholders. In many states it will use
the data compiled by the rating bureau located therein which is a compilation of data
of all or most of the insurers doing business in that state.
Rating bureaus make rates by formula. These formulas evidently represent the
aggregate damages of a large number of companies. Id. at 8509. This data has been
criticized as being merely an "average" and a "smorgasbord of the totality". Id. at 8515
(remarks of Dean E. Sharp, assistant counsel to the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly). In short, present practices may very well do what Senator Hart says they do-
force the good driver to indirectly subsidize the bad driver.
113. Hearings on S. Res. 233, supra note 25, at 8536.
114. Hearings on S. Res. 233, supra note 25, at 8536.
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as a means of setting premium rates. As has been seen, however,
present rating practices leave much to be desired.
Committee Print 1 implicitly accepts the concept of no-fault
that motoring generally should bear at least a part of the cost of
motoring accidents. 11 5 This does not mean, however, that negligent
motorists will not pay a larger share of the burden. First, nowhere
in the bill is the use of merit rating entirely precluded as a
means of risk classification. The bill allows suit for damages (in-
cluding pain or suffering) in excess of the mandatory benefits
provided."" These "intangible damages" would be measured and
contested by resort to the applicable state tort law. 1 7 Therefore,
negligent drivers should continue paying a somewhat heavier share
of motoring costs. Secondly, there is little reason to believe that
insurers could not adopt "involvement rating" systems as they
are presently used by some insurance companies. Under such a
system those most frequently involved in accidents would bear
a heavier load of the costs. 18
II. Mandatory Benefits To Those Injured
Committee Print 1 provides that all medical and rehabilitation
costs would be paid by the insurer."9 Payment would be on an
immediate basis much like medical pay provisions in current poli-
cies except that payments would be unlimited (an apparent change
from the original bill). Payment would be made to each party
involved, by his own insurer.
In the event of disabling injury, all wage loss after income
taxes would be paid by the insurer until the injured party could
recover and begin working again. 20 Here the bill goes beyond
other plans by allowing wage payments for an unlimited period.
Thus, charges of arbitrariness and discrimination, leveled at other
plans, have been to some degree quieted.
The bill limits the amount of wage payments to one thousand
dollars per month.' 2' Those who wish may purchase additional wage
replacement coverage. 2 Though one thousand dollars is an arbi-
115. KEETON-O'CONNELL, supra note 14, at 268.
116. S. 945, Committee Print One, aupra note 6, § 5(c)(2)(B). This coverage is
optional under the bill.
117. S. 945, Committee Print One, supra note 6, § 2(17) (B).
118. KEETON-O'OONNELL, supra note 14, at 269. It Is true that some of those involved
in accidents may be merely unlucky and faultlesa. But it has been estimated that out of
150,000 policyholders, perhaps 138,000 have never had an accident. Hearings on S. Res.
233, supra note 25, at 84,97 (remarks of Peter N. Chumbris, chief counsel for the minority,
Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly). It therefore seems reasonable to
assume that persons involved in two or more accidents are more accident-prone and
should bear a larger share of the burden.
119. Staff Analysis, supra note 77, at 1.
120. Staff Analysis, supra note 77, at 1.
121. S. 945, Committee Print One, supra note 6, § 2(13) (c).
122. Staff Analysis, supra note 77, at 1.
trary cutoff, and arguably, discriminatory to those who are earning
over that amount, it would seem reasonable that members of the
public in higher income brackets can handle this limitation. The
bill is here providing insurance whose cost depends, for the first
time, on the salary one earns. It is a step towards ensuring that
low cost insurance is available to lower income groups on a regular
basis.
Committee Print 1 further provides that the loss of future antici-
pated earnings would be paid as would losses from the impairment
of earning capacity resulting from injuries sustained in an auto-
mobile accident.12 Damages requested in a suit under the present
system must often include the amount by which the victim's earn-
ing capacity may be impaired. These amounts have to be projected
and estimated. The Hart proposal allows a much more measurable
standard-actual losses as they are incurred.
In addition, the federal bill would pay all appropriate and
reasonable expenses necessarily incurred in obtaining services in
substitution of those that the injured or deceased would have per-
formed for the benefit of himself or his family.124 For example,
this would include payments to an injured housewife who had to
pay someone to do her housework until she recovered.1 25 These
expenses are also commonly included in accident claims today.
Their inclusion in the bill exhibits acknowledgment of their validity
as a measurable loss.
The bill includes mandatory payments for all funeral expenses.
126
It also provides for the payment of reasonable attorney's fees
and costs of suit in cases where the insurer denies all or a part
of a claim for benefits under the policy. 127 The insured then is
protected if he must proceed against his insurer to recover dis-
puted losses.1
28
A policy qualifying under the new bill would have to pay benefits
to any owner of property (other than a motor vehicle in use) which
is damaged in an accident involving the insured's vehicle.
29 If
more than one vehicle was involved in the accident, the insurers
of each vehicle would pay for the damages on a proportionate
basis.10
A policy would similarly have to pay for any loss (tangible
or intangible) exceeding the economic loss which is "suffered by
123. Staff Analysis, supra note 77, at 1.
124. Staff Analysis, ,supra note 77, at 1-2.
125. Staff Analysis, supra note 77, at 2.
126. S. 945, Committee Print One, supra note 6, § 2(13) (E) (1i).
127. S. 945, Committee Print One, supra note 6, § 8(a).
128. Claimants' attorney's fees would not be paid If the claim was fraudulent, excessive,
or frivolous. See S. 945, Committee Print One, supra note 6, § 8(a).
129. Staff Analysis, supra note 77, at 2.
130. S. 945, Committee Print One, supra note 6, § 5(6) (2).
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an occupant of the insured's motor vehicle, or [a] pedestrian struck
by such a vehicle, if such injured person did not own a motor
vehicle or was not a spouse or dependent of a motor vehicle
owner."'' This coverage would provide excess economic loss and
pain and suffering protection for that class of persons unable to
purchase them.13 2 Claimants hereunder would be provided with the
right to retain counsel on a contingent fee basis when making
a claim.133 Such claims would be for "damage[s] other than eco-
nomic loss." These consist of "(A) tangible damage in excess of
economic loss . . ; and (B) intangible damage, characterized also as
pain and suffering or general damage, measured by applicable
State tort law. .. "
III. Optional Benefits To The Insured
Committee Print 1 provides that "the insurer shall offer pro-
visions covering loss resulting from damage to the insured's motor
vehicle with such deductibles as the insured elects."'31 5 Thus present
uses of collision insurance paid on a first party, no-fault basis,
are retained as optional provisions.
Qualifying policies would also provide, at the insured's option,
compensation for damage other than economic loss without regard
to fault to the insured, his wife, or any dependents. 86 The insured
may elect coverage for either or both of the following: "(A) tangible
damage in excess of economic loss. .; (B) intangible damage sus-
tained by such person as a result of such injury or death."
11 7
Under the options of Committee Print 1, the insured would lose
his heretofore unrestricted right to sue for damages in excess
of economic loss. He would have to buy his right for the latter
through optional coverage.
The authors of the bill feel that "because insurance against
loss in excess of that provided under the qualifying no-fault policy
is not necessary for the economic well-being of an automobile
accident victim or the family of such victim, the insurance buyer
is given the option to buy such additional coverage if he so
chooses."1 381 They feel that "[t]he controversy over whether the
131. Staff Analysis, supra note 77, at 2.
132. S. 945, Committee Print One, supra note 6, § 5(6)(1). Lawyers have been arguing
for repeal of guest statutes for a long time. This subsection § 5 (b) (1) ] effectively does
just that.
133. S. 945, Committee Print One, supra note 6, § 8(b). The fee may not exceed 25
percentum of any award the claimant receives, and may be further limited at the
discretion of the court.
134. S. 945, Committee Print One, supra note 6, § 2(17).
135. S. 945, Committee Print One, supra note 6, § 5(c) (1).
136. S. 945, Committee Print One, supra note 6, § 5(c) (2).
137. S. 945, Committee Print One, supra note 6, § 5(c)(2). Intangible damages Include
pain and suffering, Inconvenience, and loss of enjoyment of life. Staff Analysis, supra
note 77, at 2.
138. Staff Analysis, 6upra note 77, at 2.
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public wants to recover for intangible losses would be resolved
by free market forces rather than legislative determination." 139 Op-
tional coverage presents a sticky question. Many buyers will obvi-
ously be able to make a knowledgeable choice. Other, less sophisti-
cated buyers, may not understand the choice fully. Many people
feel that there is compensable suffering in many cases where actual
economic losses are relatively light.140 Therefore, it is argued, the
victim should retain his right to sue for pain and suffering at any
level of economic loss.'
4
1
How ever one weighs the two arguments, there is probably merit
to the contention that consumers have been over-insured for years.
There is little reason not to provide for "optional" coverage. If
it is provided, the ingenuity of the insurance companies again will
be taxed to convince the public that they should be covered. No
doubt they will rise to the occasion.
Since the Hart proposal allows for payment for loss of future
anticipated earnings and for impairment of earning capacity auto-
matically as part of its mandatory benefits, many impelling reasons
to sue for an excess over economic losses have been removed.
Many victims will be content to settle for their mandatory benefits
and forego suit for what is left. If such claims decrease, adminis-
trative costs will drop. This should diminish premium rates.142 If
the mandatory benefits did not go as far as they do, there would
be a stronger case to change the optional coverage to mandatory
coverage. But most of the benefits victims would be interested in
recovering appear to be provided.
Many victims today receive less than they deserve because
they have failed to consult an attorney. This can also happen
under Committee Print 1. But unlike the present system, the pro-
posed bill provides for immediate payments. Net economic losses
unpaid thirty days after receipt by the insurer of proof of loss,
would bear interest at the rate of 2 per centum per month.143 This
would obviously ensure action of one sort or another by the insurer.
The victim will know he is entitled to immediate payments. There-
fore, if a dispute arises the victim will be more prone to seek
139. Staff Analysis, supra note 77, at 2. H.R. 10222 primarily differs from S. 945
in that payments for property damage to the insured's vehicle and for damages In
excess of economic loss are mandatory. H.R. 10222, supra note 9, §§ 5(b)(1), (2) and
2(18). Authors of the House bill felt that once given the option, policyholders would
not take it. 16 AM. B. NEws, No. 9, at 5 (1971).
140. Spangenberg, The Federal No-Fault Plan-Benefits for Sale, TRLAL, Nov.-Dec.,
1971, at 31, 40.
141. Id.; Proceedings of the North Dakota Bar Association Convention, supra note
23, at 167.
142. In the long run, insurance companies may benefit. If victims who have elected
to take the optional coverage, forego suit, a windfall to the insurer will result because
it will be getting paid for unprovided benefits.
143. S. 945, Committee Print One, supra note 6, § 5(a)(4).
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immediate help from a lawyer. There will be less chance of dis-
tortion of claims because of inadequate evidence and loss of memory
of witnesses.
IV. Fraud
Committee Print 1, Section 3, provides that "[n]o person who
is--(a) the owner, operator, or user of an insured motor vehicle
, shall be liable for tort damages of any nature arising
out of the ownership, maintenance, operation, or use of such
vehicle .... ,144 It has been charged that the inclusion of these
terms will increase incidences of fraud.1 45 It is claimed for example,
that persons injured in other ways, like shoveling snow or bowling,
could easily claim the accident occurred while polishing or washing
the car because there will be no need to prove an accident in the
ordinary sense of the word.148
The words "arising out of the ownership, maintenance, oper-
ation or use of such vehicle," have been included in automobile
liability policies for many years. And for just as long, courts have
been construing them as disputes have arisen. Abolition of stare
decisis in insurance law is certainly not imminent. Judicially created
requirements that a claim follow and be rationally related to the
commonly accepted notions of what constitutes a motor vehicle
accident appear to be in no danger. There is a whole body of
insurance law providing precedents to courts who must interpret
the terms of Section 3.147 There is little reason to believe this prec-
edent will be ignored after promulgation of a no-fault bill either
by a state or the federal government.1 48
V. Collateral Sources
Whereas S. 945 originally provided that benefits received for
losses resulting in injury or death under any private or public
health insurance plan or other source of benefits would reduce
the economic damages to be paid under a qualifying policy, Com-
mittee Print 1 makes collateral sources secondary. ' 9 Exceptions
made primary are public health plan benefits and any private
144. S. 945, Committee Print One, supra note 6, § 3. The tort exemption would not
apply to anyone who Is engaging in criminal conduct which causes said damages.
145. MINNESOTA PRACTICE MANUAL 25, supra note 13, at 187.
146. MINNESOTA PRACTICE MANUAL 25, supra note 13, at 207 (remarks of Professor
David 3. Sargent, Suffolk University School of Law).
147. An exhaustive discussion of what are accidents and injuries "arising out of owner-
ship, maintenance or use" of insured vehicles can be found in 89 A.L..2d 150 (1963).
148. Where a claim Is fraudulent, an insurer would be allowed reasonable attorney's
fees and costs of suit for its defense. These sums would be treated as an offset against
any benefits due or to become due to the claimant. S. 945, Committee Print One, supra
note 6, § 9.
149. Compare S. 945, sup'a note 6, § 2(12), with S. 945, Committee Print One, supra
note 6, § 2(15).
NOTEs
insurance or plan which provides that its pay-outs shall be primary.1 50
Insurers offering qualifying no-fault policies must offer rate reduc-
tions for primary public or private insurance or plans in which
the policyholder and his family participate. 151 These changes would
ostensibly assure the compatibility of Committee Print 1 with pres-
ent health reform legislation, and it would allow a choice of benefits
to the buyer thereby avoiding a duplication of premium payments.'
5 2
Under the original bill it would have been possible to be paid
nothing out of the liability policy because everything would have
been paid out of collateral sources. Therefore, those with enough
foresight to buy accident and health insurance, or those who had
accumulated sick leave pay would find these sources depleted after
an auto accident. On the other hand, those with no jobs or with
no collateral sources would recover everything from a no-fault
policy. 53 In short, a person would be forced to buy automobile
insurance because it would be compulsory and also accident and
health insurance to protect him from other injuries, but he would
not be entitled to recover from both. 54 The argument is persuasive
and is probably one of the main reasons S. 945 was changed.
VI. Jurisdiction
Since S. 945 would become a federal act, the federal court
system would normally be susceptible to every suit or claim arising
under it regardless of the amount in controversy. 55 Committee
Print 1 anticipates that possibility by providing that no federal
district court may entertain an action arising under the provisions
of the act unless the person bringing such action meets the proper
jurisdictional requirements.150 Though federal courts would probably
150. S. 945, committee Print One, supra note 6, § 2(15).
151. S. 945, Committee Print One, supra note 6, § 5(3).
152. See Staff Analysis, supra note 77, at 2-3.
153. MINNESOTA PRACTICE MANUAL 25, aupra note 13, at 197-198. Professor Sargent's
criticism was actually leveled at the Keeton-O'Connell Basic Protection Plan which
at that time also made collateral source payments primary.
154. MINNESOTA PRACTICE MANUAL 25, supra note 13, at 198-199. Though costs
would have been held down under the original provisions of S. 945, it Is arguable
that the dictates of equity should here override cost considerations.
155. Although federal district courts have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds $10,000 and arises under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States, or where diversity of citizenship exists [se" 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331 and 1332 (1970)], such courts are also given original jurisdiction under any
Act of Congress regulating commerce. 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970). As Committee Print
One proposes to promote and regulate commerce (see S. 945, Committee Print One,
supra note 6, at 5), the federal courts would be exposed to a great rush of litigation now
handled by the states.
28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970) Is evidently one of a series of statutes which grant
federal Jurisdiction without regard to the amount in controversy. A discussion of
these can be found In C. WRIGHT, LAw or FEDERAL COURTS ch. 5 (1963).
156. E.g., diversity of citizenship, amount In controversy exceeds $10,000. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (1970). S. 945, Committee Print One, supra note 6, § 11(a).
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gain in the overall percentage of traffic cases they now hear, most
claims would remain in state courts.
157
COSTS
The traditional cost argument advanced in support of no-fault
is that because such a plan would pay losses automatically, pre-
mium rates would decrease as administrative and claims adjusting
costs drop. 158 The classical retort remains: if the plan pays damages
for everyone-innocent and wrong-doer alike-payouts will vastly
increase, thus negating gains made elsewhere.159
A true picture of this dichotomy can only be discovered by
means of actuarial studies. Unfortunately, actuaries cannot agree
on the cost results of many plans already in existence. e0 Therefore,
consumers and legislators alike are left largely in the dark. This
is unfortunate because legislative support for no-fault plans in the
states may very well depend to a great extent upon the hope that
auto insurance costs will drop.' 16
Opponents of the proposed federal act argue that it will in-
crease premium costs. The American Mutual Insurance Alliance
maintains that the average premium cost of the compulsory bodily
injury coverages will be at least 37 per cent greater than compar-
able current premiums.1 2 Others argue that predictions of cost
reductions for S. 945 are illusory because of lack of experience
and essential data.1 8 Proponents of no-fault, including the American
Insurance Alliance, argue that such insurance will lower costs and
return a much larger portion of the premium dollar to victims
than is done presently. 164 The A.I.A. also feels that the present
157. S. 945, Committee Print One, supra note 6, § 11(b). Section 11 will probably
have little effect on court congestion. If auto accident cases are a source of congestion,
any relief will lie in the hoped-for natural affect of no-fault-a lessening of claims
because of automatic payments.
158. KEZTON-O'CoNNELL, supra note 6, at 69-71.
159. See generally Spangenberg, supra note 140, at 31-33.
160. In a study of several plans including modified versions of the Keeton-O'Connell
Basic Protection Plan, the American Insurance Association, on Sept. 24, 1968,
approved a report which found that all of the plans would result in substantial savings.
Bee Hearings on S. Res. 40, supra note 15, pt. 18A, at 12513 (Cost Estimates-Report of
A.I.A., Oct. 21, 1968). On the other hand, the American Mutual Insurance Alliance
challenged these findings and concluded that such plans would generally increase
costs. See Hearings ons S. Res. 40, supra note 15, pt- 18A, at 12572-12573 (Statement of
A.M.I.A., Dec. 1969).
161. Ryan, Massachusetts Tries No-Fault, 57 A.B.A.J. 431 (1971). It should be pointed
out that this is an average rate reduction. This means that some drivers will receive a
lesser reduction, while others, in low accident areas, could get more than the 27.6 percent
reduction. There are however, indications that bodily injury premium cuts will not be
mirrored in property and collision rates, and in these areas, costs may continue rising
substantially. See No Fault: A Legislative Bomb of 1972, TRIAL, Jan.-Feb., 1972, at 8.
162. Statement of Andre Maisonpierre, Vice President, A.M.I.A., to the Senate Com-
merce Committee, Oct., 1971, cited in AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, No-FAuLT AUTO
INSURANCE PROPOSALS, No. 15, at 30 (1971).
163. Spangenberg, supra note 140, at 31.
164. Statement of T. Lawrence Jones, President of the A.I.A. before the Senate
Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee, cited in, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, sUpra
note 162, at 17.
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adversary system results in a premium dollar return which is
much too low in comparison with other forms of insurance. 6 5
The Department of Transportation concluded that a no-fault
system would affect the cost of insurance as follows:
(1) Elimination of "overpayments" of small claims and of
compensation of the less serious forms of economic loss
should produce cost reduction.
(2) Removal of most compensation decisions from the ad-
versary process should greatly simplify claims adjustment
and eliminate much legal and court costs, thereby producing
additional substantial cost reduction. 1 6
The results of other plans, though inconclusive, are helpful.
Total claims paid by insurers under the Massachusetts Plan, which
went into effect January 1, 1971, have gone down some 73.3 per
cent.16 7 As a result, the state has been able to order a 27.6 per cent
reduction in premium costs for compulsory bodily injury auto in-
surance for 1972.168 The Canadian experience with no-fault legis-
lation shows that it has been highly satisfactory in most areas.
Canadian drivers have been living with no-fault plans since 1946.169
Experience has in no way diminished their usage.170
The overall picture then, remains hopeful. Unfortunately, evi-
dence as to the probable success cost-wise of S. 945 remains sketchy.
This fact may prove to be the bill's Achilles' heel.
CONCLUSION
In the face of proven inadequacies, a defense of the present
fault system of compensation for automobile accident victims would
be naive. The existing system distributes its problems equally to
the accident victim, the insuring public and society. It allocates
benefits insufficiently, discourages rehabilitation and overburdens
the courts and the legal system. On the record of its performance,
it does little to minimize the losses of crash victims.
The public has grown to expect that accident victims will be
fairly compensated. Many "gap" solutions have been proposed in
an attempt to temper the harshness of the present system. Com-
165. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, supra note 162, at 17.
166. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, supra note 162, at 18.
167. How to Collect Without a Lawyer, New York Times, Nov. 28, 1971, at 4, § 4.
168. See Martin, No-Fault Insurance Program Interest Growing, Grand Forks Herald,
Dec. 27, 1971, at 15; Massachusetts orders cut in car insurance rates, Minneapolis
Tribune, Dec. 15, 1971, at IA. See also No-Fault: A Legislative Bomb of 1972, supra
note 161, at 8.
A compulsory reduction of 15 percent was in effect in Massachusetts in 1971.
Under the old system rate increases of 20-30 percent had been imminent See Ryan, erupra
note 161, at 433.
169. See DOT STUDY, aupra note 1, at 173. Saskatchewan was the first province to
adopt such a plan.
170. DOT STUDY, supra note 1, at 169.
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parative negligence statutes, uninsured motorists coverage, and un-
insured motorists funds have all been utilized. There is little evi-
dence of beneficial results.
Reform, then, appears inevitable. For the present, no-fault in-
surance appears to be the most viable alternative available. Many
lawyers and insurance companies appear to have accepted that
fact. The rest generally approach the problem more conservatively,
espousing less radical changes. Their arguments appear to be less
a call for restraint than they are a defense of the status quo.
If reform then is called for, what should it be and how should
it be administered? The Hart proposal raises the issue of state
versus federal regulation. The DOT experience indicates that some
form of national uniformity is warranted. The Nixon administration
favors state-by-state implementation of no-fault insurance, yet agrees
that the threat of federal intervention must lurk in the background.
A concurrent resolution to this effect was introduced into the House
of Representatives on March 29, 1971.171 The resolution called for
a congressional consensus that the regulation of insurance should,
in general, continue with the states.
7 2
There is merit in a plan leaving such legislation to the states.
S. 945 entails significant changes in the automobile insurance repa-
rations system. With the cost outlook inconclusive, there are strong
arguments for leaving the problem with the states so that bugs
may be worked out and cost experience developed.
However, state legislation has all too often been characterized
by delay.17 8 There is no reason to believe this delay will not continue
in many states. If basic reform were left wholly to the initiative
of the states, without some federal guidance, change may be slow
in coming, and meaningful change may never prevail.
Should the federal guidance be S. 945? At this point, considering
the risks of massive change in the auto reparations system, the
question must be answered negatively. S. 945 avoids the stigma of
"socialism" because it retains private underwriting and state reg-
ulation. And it does provide a highly workable plan which goes
farther than most towards the incorporation of "pure" no-fault
ideals. But it falls prey, at this juncture, to a lack of experience
and cost data which would qualify it.
With this in mind, the following actions are proposed for state
action:
(1) North Dakota, and other states who have yet to adopt their
171. H. Con. Res. 241, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
172. Id. at 4.
173. Testimony of Dr. Herbert S. Denenberg, Commissioner of the Pennsylvania
Insurance Department, before House Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance, cited in,
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, 8upra note 162, at 16.
NOTES
own no-fault plan, should begin serious feasibility studies of no-fault
insurance.
(2) Efforts should be made to benefit from the experiences
of other states with plans in existence.174
(3) The provisions of S. 945 should be thoughtfully considered
for state adoption as they represent the fruit of objective study
and investigation, and may well become the basis of minimum
federal standards.
Considering (a) the inequities in the present automobile repa-
rations system, and (b) the probabilities of delay at the state
level, Congress should consider implementation of minimum federal
standards for motor vehicle accident reparations, regardless of fault,
utilizing S. 945 as a base. However, the states should be allowed
a reasonable period of time to promulgate their own laws following
the federal guidelines. There is no reason why the most advantageous
aspects of federal and state regulation cannot be coupled. If, and
when this occurs, S. 945 will hopefully play a key role.
WARREN H. ALBRECHT, JR.
174. Particularly Massachusetts and Illinois, both of whom experienced constitutional
problems in the courts. A discussion of the two experiences can be found in TRIAL, supra
note 161 and Ryan, supra note 161.

